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The geographical location of central planning
The title of this section may appear at first blush to be a joke.
Is it not the case that everyone knows that central planning was restricted to totalitarian regimes -most recently to pseudo-socialist and communist regimes such as the late Soviet Union and its allies? However, is it really so? Planning in a centrally planned economy Between 1972 Between and 1975 Between and again between 1978 Between and 1980 , I participated in a large research project in Poland run by a joint team of economists and psychologists. The study included fieldwork: in three head offices of domestic trade in Poland and 49 enterprises (corresponding to the administrative structure of 49 voivodships) subordinated to one of them (Beksiak & Czarniawska, 1977) . Unlike speculative studies based on traditional economic models, this study aimed to describe the actual functioning of a part of a centrally planned economy.
The traditional depiction of a socialist economy defines management system as a set of principles and tools applied by central economic authorities to evoke particular decisions and actions on the part of economic units, as required by a central plan formulated by these authorities. In practice, however, just as there is no perfect competitive market, there was no perfectly centrally planned economy. A scrutiny of the translation of plans into management and then opera-
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Does Planning Belong to the Politics of the Past? tions revealed one undeniable result: nothing went as planned. Actual management processes, which were the focus of our attention, were not confined to what was described as a formal system. There were many informal ways of influencing the actual performance of enterprises, and even the formal economic instruments often changed their direction when applied in practice. This is not to say, as did many outsiders who attempted to decipher the complexities of socialist economies, that there were two systems, one formal and one informal, yielding one formal plan and one informal plan. They were intertwined in a great many unpredictable ways, making a researcher's task relatively complex. In what follows, I report some results from a study that we conducted in 1978, interviewing representatives of Head Offices of Trade (HO-Ts) and General Managers (GMs) from the enterprises subordinated to those (55 persons altogether).
One reason for the complexity -of the researcher's and GMs' work -was that the central plan had already been independently translated into local realities in two places before the enterprises or their GMs received it. One place of translation was obviously the HO-Ts (each situated in a large city) and the others were local authorities. The local authorities consisted of local administrative authorities, local political authorities, and local unions or self-management bodies. One may suspect that even those three units translated the plan differently, but because of the ruling role of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), their translations were usually aligned to each other by the local party committee. This was usually the case, but not always: some of the GMs I interviewed mentioned up to seven different translations versions of the central plan being received by the enterprise (Czarniawska, 1985) .
Not surprisingly, these translations from central plans into expectations about local plans were inconsistent more often than not -even if they came from the same source. One result was that, given the numerous individuals charged with the enterprises' fulfilling the plan, unexpected areas of autonomy arose. This mixture of control and autonomy produced consequences that can be summarized as follows:
1. Decision-making processes were extended over time in the hope that inconsistent expectations would be reconciled. One HO-T issued a directive that enterprises were to observe strict specialization in their stores. Soon thereafter, a surplus of rubber boots was discovered in many warehouses. A new directive was immediately sent to all the GMs ordering an extension of rubber boot sales to all stores -grocery stores included. The GMs decided to wait and see, and in two weeks, that directive had been revoked.
2. There was a general feeling of powerlessness because GMs could not act upwards, even in the most absurd situations. One of the companies dared to report near the end of the year that its planned objectives would not be achieved.
The CT reacted with a punishment designed for such cases: the employees had to start working on Saturdays. The problem was that on Saturdays, the stores were closed, no sales were possible, and even delivery workers had Saturdays off. Additionally, plans could not be fulfilled because of supply shortages. Employees rebelled, but the GMs advised them to go through their local unions and party committees; the managers could do nothing, as they were also expected to work on Saturdays.
3. Consequently, the GMs, convinced that the safest decisions were the best, tended to avoid risks, no matter how great the potential economic
gains. An experiment changing regulations on the responsibility for waste and deficits resulted in substantially increased sales and somewhat increased deficits, which was treated by the GMs as proof that the innovation had failed.
4.
Faced with conflicting expectations, GMs made choices that could be harmful to the enterprise or its clients but that protected the GMs from punishment. When in doubt, they followed the rules.
5.
A prolonged experience of role conflict produced negative psychological effects, yet only three individuals admitted to experiencing negative psychosomatic symptoms during the annual checkup ordered by the Ministry of Trade's Personnel Department. The GMs told me that they lied to avoid there being a record in their personnel files that could be used against them in "troubled times" (Czarniawska, 1985, pp. 69-71) .
Plans and their effects meet powerfully once more -at the time of reporting. In the view of HO-Ts, the reports sent by the GMs understated their capacities (and con- sequently exaggerated their needs) and overstated their achievements. HO-T representatives considered these inaccuracies to be the GMs' "insurance policy" -a way of minimizing their failures in advance.
The GMs agreed that the reports were inaccurate, but they explained it differently. Their demands were exaggerated because they were never met (a well-known bureaucratic vicious circle); and the GMs' achievements may have been overstated because of the irrational competition for information among various authorities. The GMs wanted to report on the 5th of each month, but the HO-Ts wanted the report by the 30th of the previous month because it would make it easier to react should anything go wrong. Thus, the end-of-the-month figures were estimated using the sales forecast (notoriously wrong, as wages and salaries were paid at the end of the month). However, the local administrative authorities wanted the information even earlier -by the 27th -and local political authorities had to be first, so they demanded a report by the 25th. All of this was happening, incidentally, prior to the use of computers for this purpose. The situation generated a boomerang effect; because the performance of an enterprise was exaggerated in forecast-based reports, expectations for the next period were set unrealistically, and the gap between plans and performances grew over time. One of the more ingenious solutions to this problem was to throw the boomerang at the consumer. A continuous shortage of toilet paper made one of the HO-Ts estimate a high demand for this product, and the producer felt compelled to import a new product line. The demand was met in full, but consumers bought incredible quantities of the paper and stored it at home. When the supply became continuous, consumers had no need to buy more, and stores and warehouses held substantial quantities of toilet paper. Another solution was called for: although toilet paper could have been in continuous supply, it was delivered irregularly, so that consumers returned to their hoarding habits.
I was given an opportunity, however, to observe central plans that worked well -in US retail corporations that I deemed to be roughly equivalent to the organisations that I studied in Poland. Between 1980 and 1981, I interviewed 40 representatives of corporate headquarters (CHQs) and CEOs or their equivalents in divisions located in Massachusetts (Czarniawska, 1985) . Many of these corporations were the same size as the Polish Head Offices of Trade, and they could have 49 or more subsidiaries.
Planning in a market economy
To put it briefly: there were central plans in US corporations, but this central planning looked different.
In the corporations that I described under the label of Autonomy (Czarniawska, 1985) , the CEOs set their own objectives based on information collected from both above (the general preferences, trends, and directions of expansion favored by their CHQs) and below (the aspirations and resources of subordinates in their own division). These plans were subsequently submitted for evaluation at the CHQs, and when disagreements arose, intensive negotiations began that did not always reach consensus. Ultimately, the CHQ usually allowed the CEOs to make their own decisions but then controlled their actions "very, very tightly". In general, the CEOs believed that the main concern of the CHQs was to create conditions that facilitated the achievement of objectives, and their primary responsibility was to advise and guide. The final outcomes were one-and five-year plans for the entire corpora- (Czarniawska, 1985, p. 20) .
In other words, the delegation of responsibility produced risk-avoiding behavior, just as the fear of punishment did for the Polish GMs.
Half of the corporations I studied had a planning process that differed from that of the Autonomy corporations, and I labelled these type of process Control. In these corporations, the CEOs received broad ceived to be an inadequate contribution. "But, like in an auction", one CEO told me, "you never start with the best offer" (Czarniawska, 1985, p. 20) . The next step was to complete a plan format, with sometimes as many as 15 "key objectives" and 30 "supporting objectives"; they tended to be numerical and highly detailed, all recorded in a relatively formalized way.
However, emergency interventions occurred during the year, and changes were introduced to the plans. If the necessity for change arose at the division level, there would be more negotiations than if it arose at the CHQ level.
The CEOs were by and large pleased with this planning process, emphasizing its clarity: "It's a very clear process, and there's no doubt in my mind during the year. I know what I am going to accomplish" (Czarniawska, 1985, p. 21) .
Comparisons between the two types of corporations revealed that Autonomy corporations shared two main characteristics: size (large) and a rapidly changing environment (continuing changes in technology, and therefore in products, and strong and dynamic compe- The corporations grouped under label of Control could be large, but if they were, they were more concerned with stability than growth, and were operating in relatively stable markets. Other corporations operated in a rapidly changing environment, but because they were small, it was relatively easy for CHQ to control the fulfillment of their plans.
Comparisons between Polish and US planning processes revealed some expected differences but also some less expected similarities. Central planning in US corporations was always more "participatory", but it must be stressed that this participation was limited to the highest levels: no "bottom-up" process started at the actual operation levels (this issue was confirmed by a great many complaints issued by Volvo executives when the company belonged to Ford; (Bragd, 2002) ). Additionally, the Polish procedures, as introduced by the 1975 reform, aimed at imitating the management pattern of US companies. The reform did not work, mostly because it did not conform to the prevailing political climate and because of constant political interventions.
My US interlocutors did not mention any political interventions, local or federal. There could be various reasons for this: either there were no political interventions (after all, these companies were hardly arms producers), or the persons interviewed did not wish to inform a researcher from a socialist country about them. Perhaps in the USA, as in Poland, the decisive influence of politics was to be found, not in the small intrigues of local party committees, but in the general political system that gave legitimacy certain procedures and routine actions.
In all cases, however, similar phenomena could be observed: the understating of capacities and the overstating of achievements, and, in the case of delegated responsibility, risk avoidance. General conclusions concerning central planning can be formulated as follows: as long as planning permits participation and negotiation, as well as a change of plans in emergency situations, the process contributes to the feeling of clarity and well-directed activity. lead to an open one; the collapse may be seemingly bottomless, to be followed by the emergence of a new regime that has a greater resemblance to the regime that has collapsed than to an open society" (Soros, 2011, p. 14) . Moreover, old habits are not necessarily punished in new circumstances. It is said, only half in jest, that the Poles are highly successful in obtaining funds from the EU because they have a long-practiced skill of describing things that never happened, both as plans and as reports.
Thirty years later
There are many similarities between central planning in a planned economy and in large corporations.
Strategic planning is central planning; the difference lies primarily in size. As Whittington (1993) (de Certeau, 1988, p. 19) . This quote captures the practices of the Polish GMs, whereas the US CEOs, especially those grouped under the Autonomy label, can be seen as strategists, with tactics being shifted further down the hierarchy.
Thus planning is always related to politics -on several levels -and its connection to performance is always complex. Not surprisingly, this observation is corroborated most strongly in public sector organizations, which I now intend to exemplify using urban planning.
Urban planning: Is chaos beautiful?
Can the analogy between economic planning and urban planning hold? I would claim that the two of the traits of planning listed above are transferable: urban planning is always related to politics, and its connection to performance is always complex. However, the position of urban planners cannot be compared to the positions of HO-Ts or CHQs: they are more similar to the Polish GMs, exposed to sometimes conflicting expectations from HO-Ts (mostly professional) and local authorities. The real difference, however, is the heterogeneity of contractors that implement the plans.
Although 49 is a substantial number of enterprises or divisions, the enterprises are similar, as are the divisions; they have the same owner and share most of their administrative routines. The political and economic expectations faced by urban planners may be fairly coherent, but a large number of units, which are, in turn, subject to a variety of strategies and tactics, must then interpret the plans. Nevertheless, political and economic expectations being translated into plans represent a powerful "calculus of force-relationship" (de Certeau, 1988, p. 19) , and the process of urban planning can be examined by comparing and contrasting it to economic planning.
I now consider two extreme examples: what I call total planning and a plan-less city.
Total planning
The usual examples of total urban planning are taken In 1703, Peter the Great conquered a city belonging to the Swedes, located where the Neva flows into the Baltic Sea. He gave it his own name and decided to make it his "window on Europe". It became the Russian capital in 1712, and the best specialists of Italian baroque were employed to give it a modern and western look. Drafted by Peter in two weeks, as the story goes, it was planned from the beginning to be an imposing capital; a regular street pattern was interspersed with impressive squares and broad avenues radiating from the Admiralty Shipyard, one of the Peter's first investments. At the end of the century, Petersburg counted 220,200 inhabitants, more than one-third of whom were employed by the administration or the military.
It was not until the 19th century that the results of Peter's urban design could be truly appreciated. Much against the will of his subordinates, he created a truly modern city, much like the one described by Thernström and Sennett (1969) .
For the writer Gogol, there was no greater contrast between cities than that between the Northern City of Petersburg and the Southern City of Rome (Fanger, 1965) . Petersburg represented an "unnatural" creation Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl Does Planning Belong to the Politics of the Past?
(against nature, both in the sense of the inhospitable temperature and violent waters), crowded buildings, and commercialism. Rome, however, represents beauty of form and movement, proportions, and harmony.
Ugliness, kinlessness, and alienation are typical characteristics of the modern Northern City. This theme was adopted again, even more powerfully, by the psychologist and sociologist of fiction, Dostoyevsky. In his eyes, Petersburg was "the most abstract and intentional city in the world" (Fanger, 1965, p. 105) , which produced the "quintessential urban life" with forms "liable to be sordid" (p. 192). It was a city "crowded, stifling, and parched" (p. 194), a city of unrelieved poverty, where the magnificence of the scene served only to emphasize human misery. Raskolnikov, in Crime and Punishment, looks habitually at the majestic panorama along the river and thinks about its coldness; all it suggests to him is some kind of a dead spirit. The real city, the live city, is the city of the sidewalk (the eulogy of which is to be found again in the writings of Jane Jacobs, 1961) , but this is also the city of disease, to 1995 (Czarniawska, 2000) . Both periods were associated with "the construction of a new Warsaw". In both periods, two planning processes were central: urban planning and development and administrative and legal developments. Both processes had a close but complicated interaction and were subordinated to politics with a capital P. The economic and technical problems were, in turn, subordinated to urban planning and legal changes.
After 1945, the authorities maintained the status quo of the public sector for a period, and jurisdiction was divided between "governmental" and "self-governmental" spheres. In Sweden, the term "local democracy" is used instead of "self-government"; England uses the term "local government" for the same purpose. These two terms reflect the assumption that both local and central government are "self-governments" -in other words, democratic. Accordingly, the differences lie in the locus of power, not in its character. The Polish terminology alludes to the fact that the central government may be, and historically has typically been, of a non-democratic nature.
State control was introduced in 1950, and all public property was turned over to the state treasury. In the case of Warsaw, this was peculiar property, as 85 per cent of the value of the city's real estate had been demolished (Wyganowski, 1993, p. 11) . Of the 957 historical buildings in Warsaw, 782 had been totally destroyed, 141 partially destroyed, and only 34 untouched (Cullen, 1994, p. 36) . The territory of Warsaw was treated as an area open to all types of urbanistic projects (in one particularly critical opinion, "the city planners got absolute power", quoted in Czarniawska, 2000, p. 19) , and to this end a special decree allocated private grounds and buildings first to the city, and later to the state. the Stalinist era turned out to be "not so bad", whereas the miracle of modernity from the 1970s, the Ursynow district, was predicted, with some exaggeration, to become a slum.
In a word, every urbanistic project in Warsaw created a wave of emotions, sometimes positive, sometimes negative; but over time and as contacts with foreign countries intensified, they were increasingly negative.
After the pivotal year of 1989, the first central government (that of Tadeusz Mazowiecki) and the two that followed focused a great deal of attention on a bill for the reprivatization of land in Warsaw. The idea of self-government was also obvious but the form that it would take was highly problematic. Warsaw was excluded from the Polish Local Government Act to resolve the problem of reprivatization. The special treatment of Warsaw in 1945 compelled equally special treatment in 1990. The act provided for a uniform conception of the municipality as a sovereign administrative entity, irrespective its size or location. In Warsaw, a Union of District Municipalities consisting of seven district municipalities (later to include the Municipality of Ursus) was created on the assumption that local problems, including reprivatization, would be easier to solve locally, whereas the union should be responsible for "general tasks", which were not specified in the act -most likely under the expectation that they would be settled through experience and negotiations. The question of the municipal economy did not seem to be difficult at first, but later a discussion began over the services it should include, and which services were better left to district management or purchased from private companies. In practice, the municipal economy came to comprise waterworks and the sewage system, public transportation, garbage collection, and district heating and gas, although the utility that produces them serves not merely the city, but the whole county. A few years later, the city government took over responsibility for the state of Warsaw's streets from the county governor. Some district municipalities took over certain spheres of activity, such as schools.
Martial law witnessed the appearance of citizen committees -groups of individuals who attempted to maintain order locally amid the growing confusion.
Almost automatically, the same people became councilors and mayors after the self-government election of 27 May 1990. They "took over the old structure with a task to continue" (Czarniawska, 2000, p. 20) , and the general feeling was that a new structure and new management rules had to be developed. This necessity became increasingly clear while the new administration gained experience and new problems accumulated.
Slowly but surely, a politicization of the municipal cadre began. Regardless of the councilors' political stripes, planning was not an activity to be cherished. Warsaw was again to become a "modern city", but along the lines sketched from 1919 to 1939, not due to any total Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl Does Planning Belong to the Politics of the Past? planning. Moreover, it seemed obvious that such key matters as infrastructure should be centrally planned and managed (Czarniawska, 2002) .
It may appear, therefore, that the idea of "total city planning" belongs to the history of modernity, which itself is becoming ancient. Postmodernity, as it is known, returned to pre-modern values, especially in architecture. It is therefore appropriate to examine Gogol's ideal city of the South: Rome.
A plan-less city
During my study of city management in Rome (Czarniawska, 2002) (Czarniawska, 2002, p. 28 the prices did, however. Next, 43 companies were to be moved to other places. But which companies? The area was infamous for a large number of illicit enterprises that had been discovered and closed down -an illicit kennel, for example -but there were many shanties the purposes of which have been forgotten and many dilapidated properties with unclear ownership.
It was clear what would remain. There were already two sports arenas; one belonged to the nearby parish and the other, which was likely to be upgraded, belonged to the municipality. There were also two paddocks and a horse track. These objects already existed; they needed only to be translated into the new park. What was happening and what was changing?
Citizens belonging to the Association for Educational Education started an action: "Let's clean our park". Baskets were located along the Tiber, and the inhabitants were encouraged to wear rubber gloves and join in the cleaning action, which began on 14 July and was to continue for "some days" be- There is also the question of whose track it is.
There is a path running along the river on the em- From the perspective of an organization theoretician, the gap between plans and declarations and their visible results may be larger than the hole in the City of Rome's budget. Chaos seems to prevail, and rather than the ancient form of villageism, it seems to depend on tricks played by and with time. On the one hand, the time between plans and their alleged realization is so long that even the best plans become obsolete.
On the other hand, plans are rendered unstable by the swift pace of political change (until Berlusconi's time, governments in Italy fell more quickly than leaves from the trees).
Urban planning and politics: A loosely coupled system?
As the reader can guess by now, I am approaching a typical set of researcher's conclusions: on the one hand and on the other hand... Yes, planning is always entangled with politics, for better or for worse. Yes, nothing goes as planned. Yes, the implementers devise a whole array of tactics to convert the plans to their own liking or at least to minimize harm to themselves.
On the other hand, planning is a powerful tranquilizer ("we know what we are going to do"), and an unplanned city is as much a disaster as a totally planned city -or even more so.
Allow me to put it this way: planning is unavoidable and so are some of its disadvantages. People will protect themselves from losses and punishments by devising tactics to defeat strategies and reverse plans. This may not be bad, as the forcefulness of total planning has heavy costs, and sometimes procrastination saves cities and companies from overly hasty innovations. The way to minimize the possible problems of these tactics is to make the planning process more participatory (for the well-known example of Malmö, see e.g. Listerborn, 2007) . Again, some observers note that such participatory urban planning follows the pattern observed in participatory software design, in which participation is often an occasion for the designers to teach the users what they can reasonably expect (Czarniawska, 2009 ).
However, this is better than plans that will only evoke resistance or subversion. Yet whereas most experiments with "communicative planning" and its variations (see e.g. Allmendinger & Tewdwr-Jones, 2002) focus on communication between planners and citizens, the lesson to be drawn from organization studies is that the contractors should be admitted to the planning process, difficult as that can be from a legal perspective.
These various examples of planning suggest another valuable lesson: when reality changes, plans must also change. They did not change in the socialist regimes as a matter of principle; but even in market economies, a change of plans in public enterprises (actually, regardless of if the owner is the state, the municipality, or private shareholders) is treated with suspicion and requires a great deal of explaining. Yet unchanged plans can become, as in Weick's story of the firefighters (1996), heavy tools that weigh their carriers down, making escape from the fire impossible.
Regarding the connection between urban planning and politics, another of Weick's (1979) suggestions applies: loosely-coupled systems, well known in architecture in earthquake-threatened areas, are more likely to survive even political earthquakes.
However, one thing is certain: despite the ideological arguments to the contrary, there are many similarities between planning and managing across public and private sector organizations, ideological divides, and times and places. This is due to a commonly shared and deeply integrated conviction that planning and management are basically neutral. After all, Lenin allegedly said that the new Soviet economy must even learn from the devil, meaning Fredrick Taylor (Wren & Bedeian, 2004) . In the private sector, any connection to politics tends to be treated as a deviation, aberration, or even a crime. Perhaps it is time to take it for granted that while of management models are sometimes transferred from the public to the private sector and sometimes in the opposite direction, one thing remains unchanged: planning's connection to politics. Having admitted this, they must be kept loosely coupled.
